It’s funny that this should be a Khan Academy demo. A good friend of mine – who also happens to be one of the smartest people I know – were chatting about the release when he told me, to my surprise, that his five year old is teaching himself things on Khan Academy already using the service’s “Khanmigo” AI assistant, which he interacts with via keyboard. Soon the little thing will be using ChatGPT to talk to Khan Academy and interact with the problem on an iPad or via video or 3D projection or whatever.
The essay by Eric Hoel, Why We Stopped Producing Einsteins, asks the intriguing question of why the world, when it became connected via the Internet, didn’t immediately begin producing Newtons or Einsteins. Where is our Feynman, our Einstein, our Hawking? Are Neil DeGrasse Tyson and Brian Greene really the best we have? Hoel’s theory is that aristocratic education, chiefly one on one tutoring, is the secret ingredient for cultivating a great mind from a young age. He writes:
Recently I was discussing with a friend the hypothesis that aristocratic tutoring (of the kind we don’t do anymore) is the only known consistent method to at least occasionally produce geniuses, to which he objected “What about Einstein?” A great point. Einstein’s reputation makes him seem one the most democratic of geniuses, a term he’s synonymous with; Einstein emphasizes the innateness of genius, its capability of coming from anywhere, even a lowly patent clerk. Isn’t there that story of him getting low grades in middle school?
Well, it turns out most of the school stuff is exaggerated or apocryphal, and Einstein had multiple tutors growing up in subjects like mathematics and philosophy, such as his uncle, Jakob Einstein, who taught him algebra. In fact, there was a family tutor of the Einsteins who went by the name Max Talmud (possibly the best name of a tutor ever), and it was indeed Max Talmud who introduced the young 12-year-old Albert to geometry, prefacing young Albert’s eventual transformation of our understanding of space and time into something geometric. Maybe we don’t make Einsteins anymore because we don’t make Max Talmuds anymore.
Hoel laments that even if you could afford to hire a Max Talmud with 2022 levels of technology (and you probably couldn’t), the implications of this from a classist perspective would give him, and would probably give prospective employers, colleges and universities, friends & neighbors, etc. the willies:
Could you hire a Max Talmud for your own family? I can certainly imagine a start-up specializing in online aristocratic tutoring, geared not toward tests or college resume padding but toward fundamentals, completely orthogonal to the norm of academic mass-production. This would actually fit in with some of other recent movements, like the “slow food” movement. There has already been a significant rise in homeschooling and even “unschooling” (which sounds like something that could, in some cases, essentially be parental-driven aristocratic tutoring). Yet, for such a start-up the problem is obvious: tutoring highlights economic privilege. And as Tocqueville pointed out, the rejection of aristocracy is a foundation of the American ethos. It’s telling I felt uncomfortable writing this essay, despite being confident it’s true.
To wit, such a startup would have trouble finding clients who could afford it and even if they could, it’s right- and aristocratic-coded and thus would lack mass-market appeal.
Not anymore!
ChatGPT, having ingested close to all of the significant written output of humankind and ground through innumerable training cycles, may indeed have a Max Talmud somewhere in there – maybe not the man himself, but something approximating him.
The difference between now and *checks watch* 18 months ago, of course, is that if Max Talmud, or something like him, lives in ChatGPT, that means that we – for the price of $19.99 a month – can have a Max Talmud of our very own. And not just one of them. We can have as many Max Talmuds as we want – and they never sleep, don’t need to eat, never tire, never get frustrated, never feel bored, never have somewhere else to be.
In this future, which is literally just at hand, on one tutoring is no longer the preserve of the aristocracy. Rather, for the price of two Starbucks coffees a month, it belongs to anyone who chooses it.
Public education is expensive, inefficient, and failing a large proportion of those who rely on it. AI is nearly-free and improving both quickly and exponentially. As we learned from businesses like Blockbuster or travel agencies that ignored the Internet, this story can have only one end. As Amazon eviscerated Sears, so too will AI education eviscerate the massive factory public education complex.
The large buildings which house these organizations will one day sit largely empty and unused like so many 1980s shopping malls, slowly decaying into ruin, with actively maintained facilities reduced to a communal gymnasium, theater, some playing fields, and a handful of of science classrooms for practical teaching one or two days a week. All the humanities will be taught at home. Working from home will become virtually ubiquitous.
Private schools will differentiate by teaching the practical aspects of some disciplines that the computer can’t handle, like rhetoric or music. Most public schoolteachers will be laid off and probably have to pivot into being directly hired by parents to supervise small group learning with the AI for those parents who cannot work from home for, say, K-8. The AI will be doing most of the teaching.
All of this will be done at a fraction of the current cost with massive raw performance gains for individual students everywhere. Education will be cheaper, faster, and better.
If one is a parent, and is presented with a choice – Option A, send your kids to a state school that will fill their heads with a bunch of mush with class sizes of 25-50, and where the class can only progress as quickly as the slowest or most disruptive member, or Option B, hand them a $500 iPad and $20 monthly subscription to have the greatest tutor in all of history give 100% of its undivided attention to your children for the next 12 years, under one’s watchful eye as one works from home, to prepare that child for entry to Cambridge or Oxford, or to become a mechanic or enter a trade, and get the absolute best education possible for that chosen discipline – the only reason you would pick Option A for your children is if you hate them.
Given the choice I am going to take Option B every single time.
I guest hosted John Deaton’s CryptoLaw podcast this week with MetaLex founder and cryptolawyer par excellence Gabe Shapiro. Watch the whole thing below:
Wyoming this week enacted the DUNAA, the “Wyoming Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act,” which created a new type of corporate form called DUNAs or “Decentralized Unincorporated Nonprofit Associations.”
I have read the entire DUNAA so you don’t have to. Long story short: this Act means that token mergers, converting token projects into corporations, and smart contracts which are legal contracts all just jumped off the drawing board and into real life.
This proposal is significantly more crypto-native in its orientation than prior attempts, chiefly the Vermont “Blockchain LLC” and the Wyoming DAO LLC.
Critics will say that changes this sweeping likely create a huge new realm of legal uncertainty, particularly in terms of applying traditional contract law principles to hard-coded arrangements with no accompanying explanatory language, and those critics are right. However, we lawyers should celebrate nonetheless, for two reasons – (a) if this catches on, it’ll generate gigatons of corporate legal work in crypto and (b) there is nothing more exciting than the creation of truly new law.
Because of the manner in which this law takes courses of dealing in crypto and allows companies to formalize these understandings and confer limited liability on their members, it is arguable that this law could constitute one of the most radical changes in corporation law since the invention of the Internet. It is quite un-arguable that this is the first serious attempt to take blockchain organizations which mimic the functions of a corporation, but aren’t corporations, and allow them to avail themselves of certain protections afforded to corporations in a crypto-native way – keeping in mind that this is the very thing that DAOs and their predecessor concept, “Decentralized Autonomous Corporations” or DACs, have been trying, and failing, to do for ten years.
Obligatory Dune meme before we start, and for the Twitter thumbnail:
Section 101 – Short title.
Title of the bill.
102 – Definitions.
The big one for present purposes is “governing principles” which means:
“All agreements and any amendment or restatement of those agreements, including any DUNA agreements, consensus formation algorithms, smart contracts or enacted governance proposals, that govern the purpose or operation of the DUNA and the rights and obligations of members and administrators, whether contained in a record, implied from the nonprofit association’s established practices, or both.”
This is no ordinary legalese. To anyone familiar with the history of smart contract theory and practice, by which I mean its entire history dating back to the 1990s rather than the Ethereum genesis block in 2015, this is sweeping, revolutionary language which I thought I would never see a government enact in my lifetime when we built the first Eth DAO prototype on testnet and proposed putting a legal wrapper around it in 2014.
What this language means – as used in the other provisions of the Act, recited below – is that a Wyoming DUNA may say that “the smart contract is the contract” without actually needing to provide plain-language equivalents. This, to my knowledge, is the first time this has ever been done and shows that the drafters are very familiar with the wet-code (language and court-based enforcement)/dry-code (software and automatic, cryptographically secure, self-executing enforcement) problem that the smart contract community has been talking about ever since it was first formulated by Szabo in 1997 and expanded on in 2006, decades before Ethereum even existed.
The problem, stated plainly, is that unless and until a law says otherwise, the usual basic position on the legal enforcement of smart contracts is that smart contracts aren’t contracts in the traditional sense, as it is arguable that they lack all of the necessary constituent elements of a contract and as such are not capable of embodying a contractually binding understanding. Wyoming, giving zero fucks, just steamrolled right over the wet code/dry code problem by incorporating “dry code” into “wet code” by reference where DUNA membership contracts are concerned.
If you join a DUNA, and the only contracts it has are hard-coded, this law says that, for the purposes of the DUNAA, that is the agreement between you and the other members. Smart contracts are contracts now, specifically contracts between the members of DUNA unincorporated associations.
It’s probably not the worst idea in the world for a DUNA to have a plain-language governing instrument anyway. But the point is, a DUNA doesn’t have to have one, so folks who are comfortable with existing DAO governance models can use the DUNA form. Whether this is advisable is another question.
103 – Governing law.
103(a) – Wyoming if formed in Wyoming.
103(b) is where things start get interesting. This is the first use in the operative of the term “governing principles.” Section 103(b) says “A DUNA’s governing principles” – that language again – “shall identify the jurisdiction in which the DUNA is formed.”
Normally what you’d expect to see for a contractually formed entity, like a partnership, would be a rule referencing some contract. See e.g. Section 15-106 of the Delaware Partnership Code which states that “the law of the jurisdiction governing a partnership agreement governs relations among the partners.” here though we have the “principles” language which refers back to smart contracts. Moreover, this language – which says that the DUNA will ID the jurisdiction in which it is formed – seems to allow the possibility that a DUNA can be formed in another state. At the moment, that means Wyoming and Wyoming only. But what about in a year or two?
104. Profits, prohibited payments.
Provisions relating to distributions of profits among members.
105. Real property.
Permits the DUNA to hold property in its own name.
106. Statement of authority as to real property.
Requires the DUNA to record a statement of authority in order to effectuate any transfers of real property (land).
107. Liability in tort or contract.
This is where things start to get really interesting.
Normally, unincorporated associations are just that – unincorporated. They don’t file with the government. They spring into existence and wink out of existence automatically as their members will them to do. (Noting that I am an English lawyer first and an American lawyer second, this is principally informed by my understanding of the concept under English law. One of my US-native colleagues, Gabe Shapiro, helpfully pointed out that some remote, faraway U.S. provinces like California have an unincorporated association statute which also does this and that US partnership/unincorporated organization law “embodies a ‘quasi-entity’ principle” post-RUPA, whereas English unincorporated associations benefit from none of the protections associated with English non-corporate, limited liability partnership forms like an LLP.)
As such, unincorporated associations – at least of the English type I’m used to – historically didn’t often handle high-value transactions or engage in serious business. For example, a local bowling club (bowling being outdoor bowls on a nice green lawn, not Big Lebowski-style bowling) or other sports club is the type of community organization which would usually adopt the form.
The “form” of course is that there is no form. For English law purposes, a UI has no legal existence separate from its members – it is its members – and individual members are personally responsible for its debts. It cannot be put into administration (bankruptcy) and offers no liability shield to its membership from the torts carried out by the organization. This is possibly why the form is more common in England than it is in the United States, where you’re more likely to simply encounter an LLC: if someone slips and falls at your bowling club, the damages award in the UK is going to be much smaller than it is in America, so in America, you want something that confers complete limited liability standing between you and that liability.
Wyoming followed California’s example and says a DUNA is “separate from its members for the purposes of determining and enforcing rights, duties, and liabilities in contract and tort” among various other protections. In this way, the DUNA is not really an “unincorporated association” but a quasi-corporation, possessing some of the key features of a corporation but without formally conferring it with legal personhood.
Thinking back to the Ooki DAO case, going the DUNAA route may be suboptimal when compared to an LLC in certain material respects. Immediately one questions the usefulness of insulating members from the perspective of regulatory enforcement (which is neither contractual nor tortious in nature, but rather concerns the enforcement of public rights by the government in its sovereign capacity) and offers no shield to state or federal, or foreign, criminal law.
Section 108- Capacity to assert and defend.
DUNAs can sue and be sued in their own name.
Section 109 – Effect of judgment or order.
Judgments vs the DUNA are not judgments against the members.
Section 110 – Appointment of agent for service of process.
Required in every state for every entity or quasi-entity registered in that state. DUNAs can be validly served with legal process at this address.
Section 111 – Summons and complaint.
To be served on the agent for service of process.
Section 112 – Claim not abated by change of members.
Change of membership in a DUNA doesn’t absolve it of liability in respect of a claim for relief vs the DUNA. Kicking out an admin who did a bad thing doesn’t mean a lawsuit against the DUNA for an action undertaken on the DUNA’s behalf by that admin goes away.
Section 113- Venue.
DUNAs are resident, for venue purposes in litigation, in the county in which it has an office or where the agent for service of process resides.
114 – Perpetual existence.
DUNAs, like corporations and (generally speaking) unlike trusts, can continue in existence in perpetuity. This can be changed by “governing principles.” Dissolution occurs per Section 120 majority vote or unless otherwise specified by the “governing principles.” Falling below 100 members will cause the DUNA to convert automatically from a DUNA into a Wyoming Unincorporated Nonprofit Association (UNA, not DUNA) which is not “decentralized” and is thus governed by the Wyoming Uniform Unincorporated Nonprofit Association Act.
Section 115 – Admission, suspension, dismissal, or expulsion of members.
Normally, such as in the case of an LLC or a partnership, these procedures are handled by contracts – in the case of an LLC, the LLC/operating agreement, and in the case of a partnership, the partnership deed or partnership agreement.
This is the first really turbo-based part of the DUNAA. Once again we have reference to “governing principles,” which can mean an implied understanding which can be more than a hunch but something less than a contract, or an explicit contract signed in blood, or just some random Solidity code with no plan language terms, or anything in-between.
The “governing principles” language Section 115 states that persons will become members “in accordance with the governing principles” of the DUNA and if such principles do not exist, the “purchase or assumption of ownership of a membership interest or other property or instrument” that confers voting rights – read: tokens – will grant such rights until the person is expelled or the DUNA is wound up. There’s a lot of room for interpretation/misinterpretation here to the extent that governing principles are implied by conduct so DUNAs would do well to write them down, in advance.
It also provides for suspension, dismissal, expulsion from the DUNA “[s]ubject to the governing principles,” and resignation under the same concept in Section 116.
It’s probably better to just drop an IPFS hash pointing to a plain language agreement somewhere in your DApp to avoid uncertainty. I’m sure many DUNAs will not do this and problems will arise as a result.
117 – Fiduciary duties.
Members do not have fiduciary duties to other members. This differs from the Wyoming LLC Act, which does impose such duties, including the duty of loyalty, a duty to account for profits, and a duty to refrain from competing with the company – see Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, Section 17-29-409, although these duties may be waived by a written operating agreement or after the fact on a per-transaction basis (see sub-section (f)). If members had such duties, it would require (unless waived) the members to not buy tokens in DAOs which were competitive with those of the DUNA or to make profits elsewhere in the crypto ecosystem based on knowledge they obtained in the course of managing the DUNA. This provision is thus at variance with previous law in Wyoming (and law which would have applied to a Wyoming DAO LLC), likely appropriately.
118 – No agency powers.
Members cannot bind the DUNA by reason of their membership. There’s a lot of analysis waiting to be written here on agency theory and how a DUNA and its members hold themselves out as its representatives. In the immediate term it is likely best for a DUNA to have a list of public key addresses for keyholders who are authorized to act on its behalf and a clear statement of how many of those keys need to sign a transaction for it to be valid and binding on the DUNA as a whole.
119 – Member interests transferable.
Membership interests are freely transferable unless otherwise restricted by code or by contract.
120 – Approval by members.
Default rule is that a voting majority of the membership is required to make certain “breaking changes” to the DUNA including forcible expulsion of members and admins, changing the governing principles, and disposing of the DUNA’s assets. DUNAs will likely want to reduce the thresholds here and/or operate on the basis of proposal and ratification rather than seeking pre-approval to dispose of any assets – otherwise, entering into a simple contract with a BORG would require a majority DUNA member vote. I hasten to add the BORG and DUNA concepts are complementary, not competitive – BORGs describe the relationship between a DAO and third party service providers, and a DUNA makes it easier for those third party service providers to get legal certainty over those arrangements. Win-win.
Perhaps an automatic process whereby contracts the DUNA proposes to enter into have a time-lock on them, so the contract will self-execute unless a majority vote cancels it, will become the norm so that DUNAs can go about their business without needing to seek prior member approval every single time.
121- Utilization of DLT.
“A DUNA may provide for its governance, in whole or in part, through distributed ledger technology, including smart contracts.”
My former colleague at my 2014-era blockchain startup Casey Kuhlman coined the phrase, “smart contracts are not smart and they are not contracts.” Thanks to this provision, where DUNA membership is concerned, smart contracts are still not smart but they definitely are contracts.
Just huge. Again, I never thought I’d live to see this. It is hard to believe this is an actual law. Bravo to the A16Z guys for pulling this off.
122- Consensus formation algorithms and governance process.
Software-driven methods permissible for governing the association as long as they’re reasonable and comply with state law. The reasonableness requirement will likely be a source of litigation in the future.
123 – Selection of admins.
Basically the DAO version of appointment of managers.
124. Right to inspect records.
This has the potential to be a huge pain in the ass. tl;dr if you have a shareholder they have the right to inspect books and records of the business. Here, the right to inspect exists but not if the access isn’t contained on “a record available to the member or administrator on decentralized ledger technology.” The way I read this is that a DUNA will have to disclose the full range of its finances and on-chain holdings, even if not on the chain on which the DUNA itself lives, and transaction history to any member at any time, and will likely need to cache this information on a continuing basis so that it can be served up on demand.
125 – Indemnification and advancement of expenses.
tl;dr members can be indemnified for expenses etc. incurred in the course of the DUNA’s business and can request to be indemnified for attorneys’ fees if they’re sued.
126 – Winding-up and termination.
Winding up is a majority voting matter unless otherwise specified – see Section 120. An administrator can be authorized to do this but is subject to the duty of care when doing so. If no administrator is appointed all members owe a duty of care when winding it up. This is fairly weighty stuff, not to be taken lightly.
127 – Mergers. (!!!)
Section 127 states that you can merge DUNA DAOs into corporations, partnerships, or other DUNAs, and vice-versa. There’s nothing original about a corporations code having provisions permitting mergers between two entities.
Introducing the DUNA into the mix is novel because it allows tokens with very loose organizing rules, crypto-native DAOs, to vote their way into the DUNA form and then vote their way into a merger with something traditional. People have been talking about what it would look like to merge one token project with another token project for the better part of the decade. I remember thinking to myself, back in the day, “there’s no legal mechanism for token projects to formally merge. Tokens are property, not entities. We haven’t got the legal rules to do it. The tax consequences would be terrible.”
And, for a time, I was right. Christoph Jentzsch and Stephan Tual’s “The DAO” project in 2016 – that DAO – existed to fund ecosystem companies, take tokens in the projects in exchange for funding, and then pass on the token ownership to its own token-holders, much in the same manner that a venture fund or, depending on what their long-term strategic outlook was, potentially Berkshire Hathaway, does today. The idea, however, that a corporations code would permit a merger with a DAO (rather than merely an acquisition of DAO tokens) was a crypto fever dream, equal parts insane, beautiful, and impossible, the sort of thing you would only speak about in a dingy back room of a startup accelerator in Berlin while buzzed on the effusions of a lightsaber-sized nicotine vape pipe.
There was, of course, no legal mechanism in the DAO, nor a technical one, to do any of this correctly. For this reason, at the time, I wrote of the project that
#THEDAO might look and feel like a company, but on cursory examination, too many gaps, too few formalities, not enough structure and legally incorrect methods reveal themselves as fatal to the exercise…
…speculation in Ether would be all the return that DAO Members should reasonably expect to benefit from under such an arrangement. In the absence of clear and unambiguous legal documentation relating to and governing (a) the DAO’s membership and formation and (b) heavily negotiated terms and conditions for each funding proposal, it would seem to me that DAO Subcontractors are, under the current state of affairs, likely to retain 100% of their intellectual property and that the benefit of that work product would not accrue to the members of the DAO.
This has been true of most DAOs created since then. Assuming DUNAs are correctly structured and get good legal advice, it is now legally possible for one DUNA to programmatically merge with another DUNA token project, or a non-DUNA to merge with a DUNA, or a DUNA to merge with a non-DUNA, by approving a plan of merger, and for that plan and and its execution to comply not with a formal agreement but merely to be in accordance with each organization’s “governing principles” – again, keeping in mind that “governing principles” here can be hard-coded in smart contracts and not require a single piece of paper or even a word in plain English, since the DUNAA defines “governing principles” to include things like “consensus formation algorithms” and “smart contracts.”
Fully automated Token M&A.
Sweet.
128 – Conversion.
You can convert the DUNA into a corporation, partnership, or LLC. Also, sweet.
I was on the Brave Technologist podcast this week with my friend Luke Mulks, talking about crypto regulation, legal aspects of decentralized app design, the First Amendment, and the intersection of crypto and AI. Play it below, or if you’re not keen on Spotify you can find links to other platforms (Apple, Google, etc.) here:
I had a very pleasant chat with one of my counterparts in the antifraud division of a bank this morning, who shall for present purposes remain nameless.
It was a very productive conversation. We agreed on a great many things. First, we agreed that biometrics is an authentication solution for devices but not a great authentication solution for one’s identity across multiple platforms. Second, we agreed that there is not a “magic bullet” solution for identity and that whenever a new gimmick other than strong cryptography was introduced into the mix – cell phone based 2FA or biometrics – these could be circumvented by determined actors without a huge amount of difficulty.
We also agreed that given the pace at which AI is advancing, the usual ways we verify identity – hearing someone’s voice, for example, or relying on scanned copies of their identity documents – are going the way of the dinosaur, and that the only thing will fix it is strong cryptography.
Most importantly, we agreed that, given the pace of A.I. development and the adoption of these tools by open-source actors, that although there is a dim awareness of an “identity problem” brewing among the highest echelons of the American state, policymakers and business leaders are not meeting the problem with the urgency it demands.
We know, for example, that the White House understands both the problem and at least partially understands what is needed to start providing a solution. See e.g. by this quote they supplied to the WSJ about what I jokingly referred to as a “Proof-of-Biden” application for “watermarking content” cryptographically…
…although the fact that they’re using the term “watermark” to describe the solution betrays a degree of ignorance of the true scale of the problem. If the only issue our society faced with AI were that we need to determine which “Dark Brandon” meme emanated from POTUS vs those which emanated from people making fun of POTUS, then yes, a cryptographic watermark with a “Vote for Biden” browser extension might do the trick.
The problem with AI, however, is not that people will post unauthorized Internet memes. It is that AI drives the cost of creating a personalized message capable of being delivered in Joe Biden’s voice, to every voter in the United States, down to near-zero. A foreign threat actor could conceivably hand-deliver campaign messaging, that sounds like the President, to every single household in the United States with zero effort, messaging which voters could not distinguish from the real thing.
Hacking the 2024 election with AI: how it might be done
It is the Friday before election day, 2024. Donald J. Trump is ahead by four points nationally and in key battleground states. (This is a thought experiment, not an expression of hope or a prediction, so don’t shoot the messenger.)
In China, PLA Unit 61398 has spent the previous 8 months cataloguing Americans’ political preferences and pairing those preferences with phone numbers. With the assistance of a secret large language model developed by the Chinese government, the PLA furiously devises propaganda which it plans to deliver in Joe Biden’s voice to every American household which paints the President in a maximally negative light, tailored to that individual voter, following a successful penetration test earlier in the year where the PLA called thousands of New Hampshire voters with a simple robocall (this actually happened, although it is not presently known who the perpetrators were).
That evening, at dinnertime, the phone rings. Every voter in America hears Joe Biden’s voice deliver a message which is tailored to terrify that individual voter and paint the President in the least flattering possible light.
Over the weekend, the campaigns duel with one another over social media. Biden’s campaign blames Donald Trump for the calls; Donald Trump’s campaign says that Biden was responsible and, in any case, Biden is someone they should fear. Campaign surrogates on social media accuse the “Deep State” of election interference. Voters, who, not being technologists, have encountered AI deepfakery for the first time, go to the polls three days later, afraid and confused.
Regardless of who wins, America would lose. The losing side would accuse the winning side of election interference; both sides would understand that the election had actually been interfered with by somebody, although they would not know whom had so interfered. On balance, the trust in American democracy would be eroded significantly, more so than it has been already.
It doesn’t really matter who wins the election from a foreign adversary’s perspective. The confusion and the acrimony is the win. It is this threat, not the obviously fake social media post from an openly partisan influencer on Twitter, that we need to be preparing for, that mere watermarking is insufficient to address, and that only one technology – cryptocurrency-as-distributed-PKI – can be integrated with our communications systems with sufficient speed that we could ensure the integrity of all communications across our society.
In the AI age, we are hugely vulnerable to foreigners and criminals using these tools to impersonate us. At every level, with every transaction.
Integrating cryptocurrency PKI with our communications systems to defeat malicious AI would be the greatest national security win since the atom bomb.
We should start a new Manhattan Project to fortify our communications from these threats.
